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The book here under review is the third instalment published so far of the new general 
history of China edited by Les Belles Lettres, with Damien Chaussende as general 
editor. Marianne Bujard’s & Michèle Pirazzoli-t’Serstevens’ volume on the Qin and 
Han dynasties was published in 2017, and Gilles Guilleux’s book on the People’s Re-
public of China was released in 2018. We are now waiting for the seven remaining 
volumes of this ambitious General History of China.  
Xavier Paulès’s La République de Chine is an important piece of scholarship that of-
fers a long-awaited up-to-date synthesis on a period of Chinese history that has some-
how been neglected in French academia since the seminal works of Lucien Bianco, 
Alain Roux and Marie-Claire Bergère. Writing a history of China strictly limited to the 
Republican era is, furthermore, a task rarely performed in the West. If one sets aside 
the dedicated volumes of the Cambridge History of China, the Republican era is too 
seldom discussed for its own sake. It more generally finds its place in two grander 
narratives: it is either a preparatory stage for the Maoist era that follows or a period 
that is intimately connected to the end of the Qing era—Peter Zarrow (2005), for in-
stance, wrote what could be regarded as a History of Republican China from 1895.1 
Rare, in fact, are the books in western languages solely dedicated to its official chron-
ological time frame. Dieter Kuhn’s Die Republik China von 1912 bis 1937 (2007) 
may be another example but it leaves aside the final decade of the period. This sets a 
challenge to Paulès: justifying whether this chronological segmentation is pertinent 
from a historiographical point of view. Although he reckons that the beginning and 
end dates of this history could easily be moved up or downstream, Paulès nonetheless 
answers this conundrum positively by stating that the Republican era holds a genuine 
unity: “It is the time when a Western styled parliamentary democracy was possible” 
(le temps d’un possible pour une démocratie parlementaire à l’occidentale, 348 high-
lighted by Paulès)—a characterisation I shall discuss below.  
Being part of a series, the book is prohibited from deviating from a foreordained gen-
eral structure: the first part is to be chronological, the second thematic. Regarding the 
former, Paulès follows a classic division: after a well-rounded introduction, the initial 
 
1
 This connection with late Qing is also hinted at in several places in Xavier Paulès’ book as he draws attention to the 
continuity between the Republican era and the New Politics of the 1900s.    
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chapter is dedicated to the 1911 Revolution and its direct aftermath; the second follows 
with the era of cliques and warlords (1916–1928); the third delves into the Nanking 
decade; the last two chapters are respectively concerned with the War against Japan 
(1937–1945) and the Civil War (1945–1949). The second half of the book then offers 
general syntheses on the economy (chapter 6), state building (chapter 7), social trans-
formation (chapter 8), and cultural renewal (chapter 9). A conclusion in “the manner 
of an epitaph” (341) closes the monograph by discussing other historical narratives not 
adduced, and the continuity or resemblance between today’s China and that of the 
1930s. This main body of text is finally supplemented with numerous appendices. 
They include beautiful coloured maps, a succinct chronology of the period, and sev-
eral figures such as a comparison between the populations or the railroad systems of 
different countries, the family tree of the Song family and the political testament (yizhu 
遺囑) of Sun Yatsen (in both French and Chinese). The main body of the text also 
features many original photographs and drawings. A general bibliography which in-
cludes works in French, English, and Chinese closes the volume. A peculiarity here is 
that Paulès has singled out twelve books whose reading is deemed critical for the neo-
phyte. Although I would not have chosen exactly the same references, his choice ap-
pears to me very pertinent. 
Reviewing a book whose scope spans over four decades and that touches on so many 
dimensions of the history of China is no easy task, especially when one faces a work 
of this quality that mobilises such a vast array of references. Specialists in narrow fields 
will always think that information is missing or that too much insistence is given to 
some details not deemed important. Others could complain that the book is stronger 
on some aspects than on others—Paulès gives for instance much more importance to 
political and economic institutions than to religious ones, religious life being dealt with 
in about five pages.
2
 Paulès’ fascinating and well-documented descriptions of social and 
cultural life under the Republic could sometimes also be regarded as Southern China-
 
2
 It is nonetheless interesting that “religious elements” find their way on to pages dedicated to other themes. Fortune 
tellers and geomancers are, for instance, mentioned twice elsewhere in the book as tertiary workers or in a paragraph 
expounding on Chinese social practices.  





 But, in order to focus on what is of greater relevance and to do justice to 
Paulès’s scholarly ambition, I am of the opinion that his book should mainly be eval-
uated on the general narrative it offers and the argumentation it stakes out to attain his 
conclusion. In the pages below, I would like therefore mainly to discuss Paulès’ char-
acterisation of the period. However, before entering into the core of my critique, I 
would nonetheless like to raise several disparate elements of particular interest.  
The first point to underline is that Paulès’ book does not simply compile a gallery of 
academic studies regarding the period 1911–1949. On several occasions, the author 
adduces original archival materials to convey his view or to nuance previous character-
isations of an event (e.g. 53, 160, 177, or 184). In his discussion regarding the issue of 
refugees and circulation of people during the war with Japan, he notably points to the 
fact that no research has been done on the movement of the Chinese population to-
ward the Japanese occupied zones, and, on the way, he makes reference to archives 
he has personally consulted that relate to this taboo subject (143–144). In general, the 
author’s own research contributes greatly to the general picture of Chinese history. 
Regarding the utilisation of studies by colleagues, one could simply regret that Chinese 
sources are used unevenly throughout the book. They are often invoked when dealing 
with raw data, or when expounding on a particular topic that has been neglected by 
Western historiography (for instance regarding the 1930 “War of the Great Plain” 
Zhongyuan dazhan 中原大戰, 101–103, or the “party-isation” danghua 黨化 of soci-
ety under the Guomindang, 248). However, in contrast to the numerous theories by 
colleagues writing in English and French that Paulès discusses, only very few, if any, 
Chinese historians’ names are mentioned in the main text as historians whose inter-
pretations are directly validated or challenged. Maybe remarks regarding Chinese 
scholarship ought to be stated in the same manner as with Western sources and not 
only through generalities on “Chinese scholarship” or “Marxist historiography.” This 
is, however, a classic impediment largely shared by Western sinology, and we should 
all carry out a general introspective reflection on this matter.  
 
3
 An original bias – in comparison to the large majority of Shanghai-centred works –, that he has admitted in a very 
interesting debate over his book held at the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisation on 21 November 
2019. Audio in INALCO 2020.   
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Speaking of historiography, it should nonetheless be stressed that the author has a real 
grip on the previous and ongoing research in his field. Almost every sub-subject is first 
introduced by several commentaries on the general scholarly tendencies regarding the 
theme or period under discussion. Here, Paulès offers pathways through tangled his-
torical debates and often points out insufficiently explored problems and topics. In-
deed, the author really has a sharp eye for singling out possible new fields of inquiry, 
and I can but hope that the reading of his book will entice francophone scholars to 
explore them. This is particularly the case in his chapter about the Chinese economy, 
which is a model for the genre—it is maybe the clearest synthesis I have ever read on 
the topic. Aside from outlining the great tendencies of economic history, Paulès pin-
points the lack of studies in specific economic sectors (like the service industry) or the 
methodological issues inherent in the potential study of key dimensions of Chinese 
economic life, such as the problem of the recycling of objects (217). Regarding the 
reasons behind the Guomindang (hereafter GMD) sclerosis, he burrows into an im-
portant truth when he notes that, oddly, almost no attention has been paid to the ab-
sence of a renewal among its leaders (180). It should also be highlighted that Paulès, 
who is well versed in the historiography of his homeland, draws several brilliant paral-
lels with French history (e.g. centralisation after revolution in a Tocquevillian sense, 
47; or the comparison between the 1947–1948 elections and the electoral system un-
der the Second Empire, 183). He additionally makes use of some analytical concepts 
from French history that hit the spot: Dominique Barthélemy’s notion of “political 
viscosity” (67) should definitely be popularised to describe the warlord era.  
Thirdly, in an academic world where jargon is often preferred to literate style, it should 
be stressed that reading this book is a genuine pleasure. Paulès often has very witty 
punchlines that are certain to be quoted in future works. “The 1911 Revolution is the 
daughter of the telegraph” (30), “Although the old regime dies in 1901, it is buried in 
1912” (348) or the harder to translate into English “Pékin n’est pas seulement un sym-
bole, c’est aussi un pactole” (51) are representative examples. One can for sure say 
that Paulès has a way with words. His prose is sprinkled with recherché adjectives and 
florid verbs, while he devises very interesting appellations: warlords are referred to as 
“satraps.” His style will certainly shake up many literate readers. It must also be added 
that Paulès often offers very concrete and picturesque descriptions of daily life in 
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China that are very pertinent. They succeed in capturing the social universe of the time. 
In a word, his prose really serves the content. 
This being said, let us discuss in more detail the scope and the governing principle of 
Paulès’ La République de Chine. In his introduction, Paulès explains that his book is 
concerned only with China proper or the China of 18 provinces, and does not delve 
into peripheral territories such as Mongolia, Tibet, or Manchuria. This choice is justi-
fied—Paulès wishes to avoid the 1949 teleological narrative that anchored these non-
Han territories as necessarily Chinese—but so doing raises issues. Aside from dismiss-
ing arguments that could strengthen or weaken his argumentation (what for instance 
to do about the Mongolian crisis under Yuan Shikai briefly mentioned p. 19?), it soon 
appears difficult to write a history of Republican China without Manchuria, especially 
after 1931. In the end, Paulès cannot forgo it. There is therefore a small discrepancy 
between the scope he originally sets and the history he narrates—a positive discrepancy, 
I would say, because Paulès shows very interesting developments regarding China out-
side the 18 provinces, notably when he dwells on Chinese cultural influence on its 
close and farther neighbors (334–339). I was surprised to learn that in the 1930s, 30% 
of restaurants in Lima (Peru) were run by Chinese! As such, in truth, Paulès book is 
not concerned only with China proper, it simply drops Tibet and Mongolia. However, 
this is but a minor detail in comparison to what appears in my eyes an incongruity of 
greater importance: it seems to me that Paulès’ conclusion is not completely in con-
formity with his development.  
To clarify my position right away, I should state that in my eyes both his conclusion 
and his development are accurate. I share his belief that the Republican era was a 
“time when a Western styled parliamentary democracy was possible,” yet I have un-
derstood the text that precedes this characterisation as mainly a GMD-centred history 
of the Republican China in which there was not much room for democracy. By point-
ing out this apparent non sequitur, I do not wish to downplay the value of Paulès’ 
exposition: he successfully moves away from both the narrative of the teleology of 
Communist revolution and the modernisation theory, while providing a convincing 
depiction of this era. He rightly replaces the GMD in its due place: it was the main 
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actor on the scene, it accomplished much, and it fell out of it mainly because of con-
tingent reasons. La République de Chine is a book constructed around this strong 
thesis. It is therefore a crucial read that strongly argues in favour of a positive evaluation 
of the GMD during the first half of the twentieth century. The conclusion averring that 
it was a possible time for democracy is simply not the one I was expecting after reading 
the nine chapters. After all, Paulès clearly points to the fact that the GMD was incapa-
ble of turning democratic (182–84).  
In order to defend the idea that the Republican era was a “time when a Western styled 
parliamentary democracy was possible,” Paulès should, in my opinion, have put the 
emphasis on what is unfortunately a neglected aspect in La République de Chine: in-
tellectual history.  
Despite a recent surge, French historiography, be it of modern China or any other 
country, has never been very keen on intellectual history (Lilti 2014). Much justifica-
tion could be raised for this judgment in general but also in the particular instance of 
the Republic of China. In the case at hand, it is obvious that Chinese intellectuals were 
not at the centre of the picture. They no longer wielded the impetus of their literati 
forerunners. But I cannot help but wonder how it could be possible to anatomise the 
Chinese Republican era as a time for a possible democracy without paying attention 
to the debate of political ideas. Democracy takes hold not solely in institutions, but 
also in the men and women who put it into practice. Paulès is aware of that, for he 
speaks of the “invention and diffusion of a new post-imperial political culture” (229), 
yet in this subsection he expounds only on architecture, symbols, and political rituals 
practised by speechless figures. In terms of “ideas” and debates, aside from very gen-
eral remarks on the different “isms” available at the time (329–330), the book puts on 
display only Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People and his theory of five powers. 
Unfortunately, no other political figures’ or intellectuals’ positions are discussed. With 
an ounce of exaggeration, it is as if there was no exchange of ideas within or without 
the GMD. The 1930s controversy over democracy versus dictatorship is for instance 
missing from the frame.  
Although the author justifies why he did not put more emphasis on the Chinese Com-
munist Party (hereafter CCP) and its ideological evolution, it seems to me that he has 
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in fact swapped a CCP-centred history of Republican China for a GMD-centred one. 
Hardly any other voices are heard. Liberal intellectuals of high calibre are mentioned 
here and there but without hinting at the ideas they put forward. Luo Longji is referred 
to, for example, as a theoretician of human rights in China (185), but nothing is said 
about the debates over those rights. In total three pages are dedicated to the Demo-
cratic League or to its members (173, 182, 187), and they are mostly informed by 
Edmund Fung’s vision of it. Despite their obvious failure to have much impact on 
political life, many political parties or movements—like the Chinese Youth Party of 
Zeng Qi, Deng Yanda’s Third Party or Zhang Junmai’s Chinese National Socialist 
Party—tried from the 1920s to find a place in between the GMD and the CCP. Bor-
rowing Roger Jeans’ helpful term, one could say that these self-declared third forces 
sketched “roads not taken” (Jeans 1992, X) that could really be regarded as a possible 
way to democracy in the sense of Paulès’ conclusion. There was also in the 1930s a 
strong interest in the rural world. Many rural reconstruction movements experimented 
with other ways of carrying on the political organisation of society. By enlisting the rich 
world of political ideas and practices beyond the GMD and the CCP, Paulès could 
have shown with stronger arguments that the Republican era, or twentieth century 
China for that matter, was not simply a race to power between two soviet-style parties. 
This could also have prevented oversimplification and inexactness. Qualifying Liang 
Qichao’s Progress Party (38) or Liang Shuming as conservatives without ever discuss-
ing their position or explaining the meaning of this label in the Chinese context is a 
little dissatisfying because it is arbitrary. Both men adhered to the Republic, and ex-
tolled some forms of socialism. Are they denoted as conservative only because of their 
infatuation with Buddhism or Confucianism? 
Delving into the place of Confucius in twentieth century China, I should point out one 
specific topic in which Paulès’ lack of interest in intellectual history has not served well 
his otherwise brilliant synthesis. His treatment of May Fourth remains mired in a mon-
ological narrative. To him, Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi are more or less the only figures 
of the New Culture movement—which is by the way not differentiated from the May 
Fourth movement. It seems that Chow Tse-tung’s The May Fourth Movement of 1960 
has remained Paulès main source of information on the topic. Without mentioning 
very recent studies that have insisted on the diversity of movements within May Fourth 
Ciaudo: Book Review                                                                      315 
 
 
and the attempts to subsume them under one single narrative since the time of the 
First United Front (Forster 2018; Kuo 2017), Paulès has missed the pluralisation and 
decentralisation of May Fourth (Ip et al. 2013) or the many scholarly endeavours to 
go “beyond the May Fourth paradigm” (Chow 2009) that started two decades ago, as 
well their implications for our understanding of the political debates of the time. As 
rightly noted by Yves Chevrier, iconoclasm was, for that matter, “not a cultural answer 
to a crisis of culture—a contradiction between identity and modernity—but a political 
response to a political crisis” (Chevrier 2007, 270). Studies in Chinese conservatism 
have also added very much to our understanding of the 1920s and 1930s, decades 
whose scholarly depictions have grown richer and more nuanced. Although pro-Con-
fucian figures did not openly take part in the field of politics, their pleas were neither 
uninfluential nor disconnected from grand political issues. Contrary to what is com-
monly implied, Confucianism was far from buried in 1919. It is therefore a pity that 
this side of the story was not narrated in La République de Chine.   
Yet, despite this criticism—which is, of course, formulated by someone interested in 
intellectual history—, I would like to restate that Paulès’ work is a great book filled with 
acute insights. He succeeds in painting a comprehensive picture of the Republican era 
while dovetailing his depiction with a critical appreciation of the state of the art. His 
contribution to the reevaluation of the importance and the successes of the GMD 
should not be missed. It is a must-read for any francophone working on the Republi-
can Era, and more largely on modern China.  
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